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Senator from Oregon has quoted time and time again on the floor of the Senate the opposition to the Mexican War by a dissenter of his day, a man named Abraham Lincoln, a Congressman from Illinois, who forthrightly and courageously spoke out about the illegality of the Mexican War, about the immorality of the Mexican War, about the lack of justification of our involving the American people in the Mexican War.

Mr. President, that great speech of Abraham Lincoln in the House of Representatives stands as one of his many deserved monuments in the history of the Republic.

So, too, was there a resolution in the case of Cuba in 1898. We heard it said in Congress at that time that a show of national unity would frighten Spain out of Cuba. But it led to war with Spain, instead.

One of the comments of the so-called war advocates in regard to both the Mexican War and the Spanish War is that we won both of them.

Oh, Mr. President, so often what a sting there is in victory. The fighting in those two wars stands as despoiled pages on the record of American history. Victory does not make right. We can commit enough inhumanity against both our men and the enemy to force a surrender. Some will call it victory, but history will record it as a great defeat because we will have defeated so many of the ideals of our Nation.

That has been our experience with the Tonkin Gulf resolution. It has been productive of more war and ever more war in Asia. If it had any effect upon North Vietnam at all, it was to prod that country into new and more carefully organized military and political activity for her own defense.

If one can find any comfort in our experience with this resolution, it is that no future resolutions of this kind will be accepted by Congress so long as anyone is here who went through the Tonkin Gulf experience.

#### NEW RESOLUTION NEEDED

Although I have always believed that resolution was a mistake, and that it should be rescinded, yet it is obvious that much more is needed.

I tried to rescind it, as will be recalled, a year and a half ago, and the course of action was to lay my proposal on the table. Whereas there were only two votes against the resolution in August 1964, being the votes of the Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING] and the senior Senator from Oregon, we had five votes against the motion to lay on the table, and everyone in the Senate knew what they were voting on. They were voting not on a motion to lay on the table, except in technical form; they were voting on whether or not they wanted to go on record on the floor of the Senate contrary to the position many of them take on the other side of those two doors. When many of them are out in the cloakroom, they freely admit they made a mistake when they voted for the Tonkin Gulf resolution in the first place, but not here on the floor of the Senate are they willing to admit they made a mistake by a vote to repeal. So they voted for the motion to lay on the

table, many of them thinking they could explain it by saying it was a vote on a procedural matter. But the country knew it was a vote on a substantive matter.

I say respectfully to my beloved friends in the Senate that it is easy to make speeches here and elsewhere in the country raising regrets and doubts of the wisdom of passing the Tonkin Gulf resolution in the first instance, but I know of no gymnastic ambivalence that is going to enable any politician in the Senate or the House of Representatives to be on both sides of this issue. If they try to do that, I think the voters will catch up with them, and well they should.

I would that the resolution could be repealed or rescinded. I am enough of a political realist to know that the probabilities of that happening are so remote that there is a greater chance for a frozen snowball to remain frozen in an oven of 150 degrees Fahrenheit. Therefore, my approach today is somewhat different from my approach of February 1963, when I sought to rescind the Tonkin Gulf resolution.

Although the administration takes the view that what Congress thinks is irrelevant, I believe the kind of resolution that is needed is a statement of congressional policy on how a major war in Southeast Asia should be dealt with by the United States. Such a resolution is needed because our previous policy of the Tonkin Gulf resolution has failed totally to arrest the size and scope of the conflict.

We need a resolution that recognizes that in acting unilaterally, the United States has not been able to stop the fighting, and that it has in fact grown into a major war that threatens the peace not only of all Asia, but of the entire world. It should recognize that the naval incident of August 1964, is no longer relevant to the situation, and the action that Congress anticipated at that time against North Vietnamese PT-boats has long since been carried out. The resolution I am offering today is based on these facts.

It expresses the sense of Congress that the President and his administration act as we are required to act under the charter of the United Nations. It states that the President should request the Security Council of the United Nations to meet on the subject of the entire Vietnamese war, and asks that he call upon the Security Council to issue a call for a cease-fire by all parties on all fronts of the fighting.

One of the essential provisions of my resolution is that we must propose and be willing to comply with a cease-fire order. We have got to stop the killing, and we have got to stop the sending of our young men to Southeast Asia to be slaughtered in a war that is unjustifiable, illegal, and immoral. That is the test of our ideals. It means, as I said in my colloquy with the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER], that we must submit a resolution to the U.N. that is subject to a veto or adoption. We must submit a resolution in which we pledge that we will accept the jurisdiction of the United Nations and comply with its orders. That is what the charter provides, and that is what we have never been willing to do. Until we do it, and I speak most respectfully of my President,

all of his talking about being willing to go to the United Nations is empty semantics.

The language we must use and the pledge we must make is that we will abide by the jurisdiction of the procedures of the charter. The first thing we have to be willing to commit ourselves to is that we will support a cease-fire order. That will stop the killing. Of course, as I shall point out later, it calls for enforcement, but that is what the United Nations Charter was set up to do.

That is why I have been heard to say so many times in these historic debates in the Senate that the sad thing is not a single signatory to the United Nations Charter, including the United States, has ever carried out its solemn commitment vis-a-vis the war in Vietnam. That goes for our neighbor to the north—Canada—for Great Britain, the Scandinavian countries, France, Russia, Italy, Japan, India, and the Latin American countries. Every signatory has failed to carry out the clear obligation that their signature to the charter imposed upon them when they signed it.

If the charter is becoming a dead letter, as some critics of the United Nations declare, that is only because the signatories to it no longer seem to honor their signatures in a great world crisis such as this.

It further urges that the United States ask the Security Council to take whatever steps necessary to enforce that cease-fire, and it states that whatever action the Council decides to take under article 25 will be accepted and carried out by the United States.

The resolution states further that if the Security Council fails to act to assert jurisdiction over the war, the President should pursue the same course of action in the General Assembly, just as we did in the case of the Congo when the Security Council failed to act and the General Assembly acted instead to prevent a colossal confrontation among nations warring for control of central Africa.

When it is India, Pakistan, Israel, or Egypt, or the Soviet Union that is involved in warfare, the United States has always insisted that the United Nations act to take jurisdiction and to move in and settle the dispute.

Senators have heard me discuss many times the situation involving the Cyprus problem, when Great Britain and the United States attempted, behind the scenes, to work out an understanding to get NATO to move in on the Cyprus issue.

As the Record will show, 10 days before I had the slightest idea of what Russia and France were planning in regard to Cyprus, I took the floor of the Senate and made a major speech calling for United Nations action on the Cyprus problem. I pointed out that there was not a scintilla of legal basis for NATO involvement in Cyprus, but that the United Nations Charter cried out for United Nations intervention.

Later, we were told that the Pentagon, the State Department, and the CIA were not aware of what Russia and France were up to at the time. I said during that debate that it was nothing new for the